The Psychology of Terrorism

In all parts of the world the processes of globalization have produced winners and losers. Socioeconomic disparities, both between and within countries, and—probably more importantly—a lack of civil liberties are generally regarded as the main causes of political and religious radicalization.

The most extreme form of radicalization is represented by terrorist groups as well as individuals acting on behalf of ideologies that advocate violence. The transnational, nonstate nature of terrorism and insurgencies has evolved into one of the most prominent threats to international security, stability and prosperity.

Since it has proved impossible to counter terrorism solely with physical means, it is widely acknowledged that the threat of terrorism has to be addressed at a psychological level too. In general terms, this means seeking to reduce support for terrorist organizations within the societies that host them.

Though extremist leaders often have middle class backgrounds and education, they increasingly generate support for their cause among socially, politically and economically disadvantaged groups prone to political radicalization. Supporters not only become the recruiting pool for new volunteers willing to kill and die for the cause but—perhaps more importantly— they represent the primary source of legitimacy for the extremists. Thus, since it is almost impossible to cut off the malign influence of extremist ideologies on already politically radicalized groups, it is necessary to reduce political radicalization in the first place.

Methods to undermine radical ideologies and to prevent disadvantaged social groups from joining violent extremist organizations have to accompany today’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies. According to most scholars and practitioners, this is the path to a truly comprehensive response to the challenge of terrorism in the 21st century. But how to achieve this in practice remains unclear.

How can states and international organizations integrate private companies, NGOs and the media into long-term counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies? How can private companies and NGOs operating in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq positively affect the “hearts and minds” of the local population, and, thus, actively contribute to counterinsurgency and state building operations? And how can companies and governments use their influence in developing countries to reduce political radicalization beyond the simple formula of “jobs, jobs, jobs”?